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LIBERALISM, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
HUMAN DIGNITY 
Do international standards regarding human rights require the 
existence of a liberal regime? This was the thrust of Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly's 
essay in the September 1986 issue of this Review. Neil Mitchell takes vigorous issue with 
this contention, arguing first and foremost that Howard and Donnelly have not defined 
liberalism satisfactorily. Howard and Donnelly present a spirited rejoinder. 
In "Human Dignity, 
Human Rights, and Political Regimes" 
(this Review, September 1986), Rhoda 
Howard and Jack Donnelly argue that 
human rights require liberalism: "We con- 
tend that internationally recognized 
human rights require a liberal regime" (p. 
802). This contention is supported by a 
very abstract definition of liberalism, by 
inappropriate comparisons, by neglecting 
other ideological traditions that can also 
claim to support human rights and the 
integrity of individuals, and by ignoring 
consideration of other conditions that 
may be necessary for human rights. 
Howard and Donnelly's definition of 
liberalism is tied to no particular theorist, 
century, or country, making it easier to 
produce a set of values with an article-by- 
article correspondence to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The defini- 
tion is variously defended as an "ideal 
type," as "a plausible standard reading of 
the liberal tradition," and finally with the 
revealing comment, "Our subject in this 
article is human rights, not liberalism" (p. 
802). Their subject needs be both if they 
are to make their argument effectively. 
Simply stipulating a set of values and call- 
ing them liberalism and then showing that 
these values are compatible with a con- 
ception of human rights is not a com- 
pelling method of argument. One could as 
easily stipulate a floating* pastiche of 
"socialist" values, affiliated neither with 
Marx nor with Tawney, grounded on no 
particular piece of history or society, but 
which also fits human rights. Without a 
more careful explication of liberalism, the 
connection Howard and Donnelly assert 
raises all sorts of objections. What we end 
up with is a philosophical hybrid that no 
one will claim but that is apparently 
created by crossing John Locke with 
Edward Kennedy, perhaps in the cosy 
confines of a British welfare state that 
works, presumably after having first 
detached Northern Ireland. 
Thus, we have emphasis on the pre- 
political rights of individuals that one 
finds in the Two Treatises, without the 
more awkward bits like the limiting of 
government to the protection of property. 
Instead we are told that liberalism means 
that government is required "to cancel 
unjustifiable market inequalities" and 
ensure a decent standard of life for all-so 
bringing it into line with Articles 22 and 
25 of the universal declaration. The 
familiar liberal theme, going back to 
Locke's peculiar "title" to charity, and 
often espoused by Thatcher or Reagan, 
that these needs can be met privately is 
not considered by our authors. They even 
extend their argument to include a right to 
work (Article 23)-not simply the more 
recognizable liberal position of a chance 
to work-which they derive from the 
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liberal principle of "equal concern and 
respect." One wonders why they stop 
here-why not also derive equality of 
condition from this principle? They do 
say that "a certain amount of economic 
liberty is also required" to "reflect free 
decisions based on personal values that 
arise from autonomously chosen concep- 
tions of the good life" (p. 803), so rather 
than derive absolute equality, perhaps we 
should stop at the well-known liberal 
slogan "to each according to his need"! 
This argument that liberalism is not 
only fully consonant with civil and polit- 
ical rights but also with economic and 
social rights crystallizes in the contrast 
made between liberalism and the minimal 
state. The minimal state which elsewhere 
one sometimes hears described as "clas- 
sical liberalism," is for Howard and Don- 
nelly not liberalism because "in its very 
essence [it] is a violator of human rights" 
(p. 807). But their argument does not rest 
on circularity alone; the authors add to 
this their uncertainty as to whether mini- 
malism is logically consistent: "Beyond 
minimalism's obvious incompatibility 
with international human rights standards 
V . . its deep commitment to protecting 
private property while denying all other 
economic and social rights borders on 
logical contradiction" (p. 807). While 
hedging with the word "borders," 
Howard and Donnelly say that unlimited 
accumulation (which one finds in the 
scholarly interpretation of the Two 
Treatises incidentally) cannot be justified 
in terms of "enjoyment of personal auton- 
omy" (p. 807). For "at a certain point, 
additional economic resources contribute 
nothing at all to personal autonomy" (p. 
807). Who is to determine this point with- 
out infringing on the other liberal princi- 
ple that they assert of "one citizen's con- 
ception of the good life being no nobler or 
superior to another's" (p. 803) is not made 
clear, and the other grounds for unlimited 
accumulation-found in Locke, for exam- 
ple-are not considered. Further, it is 
argued that the minimal state is "self- 
destructing if it recognizes equal, univer- 
sal civil and political rights" (p. 807). Peo- 
ple will use their political rights to destroy 
minimalism and institute welfare states. 
But, of course, there is no general require- 
ment that I am aware of that value 
systems, traditions, or regimes be inter- 
nally consistent; they may even contain 
within them the "seeds of their own 
destruction." Howard and Donnelly hold 
the conviction that Sir Isaiah Berlin warns 
against in "Two Concepts of Liberty," 
namely, "that all the positive values in 
which men have believed must, in the 
end, be compatible, and perhaps even 
entail one another" (1970, 167). In any 
case the ideal of a minimal state is elec- 
torally popular at the moment, as the 
elections and reelections of Thatcher and 
Reagan illustrate. The point is that the 
minimal state is not compatible with some 
articles of the universal declaration, as 
Howard and Donnelly recognize, but 
their claim, which is presumably essential 
to their thesis, that it is somehow a less 
"pure" form of liberalism is not convinc- 
ing, given the arguments presented. With- 
out clearly specifying the origins of liber- 
alism, then, one is left with the suspicion 
that the method of constructing the 
"plausible standard reading of the liberal 
tradition" is to first read the universal 
declaration and then pick, choose, derive, 
and discard as necessary. 
The authors contrast liberalism with 
what they call communitarian regimes 
"that give ideological and practical prior- 
ity to the community . . . over the indi- 
vidual" (p. 808). One type of communi- 
tarian regime is communism. Their 
abstract, or "pure," definition of liberal- 
ism is inappropriately compared to a con- 
cept of communism based on "the struc- 
ture and official ideology of contem- 
porary communist societies" (p. 809). Not 
surprisingly, communism is found to fall 
short of human-rights standards-as 
would liberalism if it was constituted in a 
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similar way by, say, the McCarran- 
Walter Act, the Diplock courts of North- 
ern Ireland, and so on. 
In communist societies, we are told, 
"one is equal not by birth or by nature, 
but only to the extent that one is essen- 
tially indistinguishable from one's fellow 
communist citizens" (p. 810). Com- 
munism, then for Howard and Donnelly, 
is Orwell's satire or "the dark night of 
totalitarianism in which all cats are grey." 
They go on to claim that communism is 
even incompatible with economic and 
social rights because these rights are "con- 
tingent on the discharge of social duties" 
(p. 810). This argument seems to forget 
that civil and political rights, even in 
liberal theory (let alone practice), are con- 
tingent. With John Stuart Mill, freedom 
of opinion is contingent on not harming 
others or not instigating "some mischiev- 
ous act"-corn dealers starve the poor. 
With John Locke, toleration is contingent 
on loyalty (not to be extended to Catho- 
lics, for example, in his day). And in prac- 
tice, of course, foreign "communists" are 
denied entry to the United States, and 
domestic communists are off and on 
denied free speech for national-security 
reasons. In short, the good of the com- 
munity in liberalism also takes precedence 
over individual rights. What makes 
Howard and Donnelly's argument here 
extraordinary is that the penultimate arti- 
cle of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which they say they "accept with- 
out argument," explicitly recognizes the 
importance of "discharging social duties" 
and the contingency of individual rights 
on these duties, despite their claim to the 
contrary (p. 806). 
Now to move from what is included to 
what is omitted; Howard and Donnelly, 
in asserting that human rights require a 
particular type of liberal regime, ignore 
other traditions and value systems that 
condemn torture and political repression 
and provide for economic and social 
security. Most obvious, of course, is 
Marxism, not as caricatured in the Soviet 
constitution or Soviet practice but that 
form of Marxism that provides the 
analysis of the Paris Commune or looks 
forward to "an association, in which the 
free development of each is the condition 
for the free development of all." We could 
also look at the socialism of R. H. 
Tawney, George Orwell, Bernard Crick, 
or the Swedish Social Democrats for that 
matter. Liberalism, then, even when it is 
defined as it is in this article, does not 
have exclusive claim to values that sup- 
port human rights. There are alternative 
traditions and regimes, and thus liberal- 
ism cannot be said to be a "requirement" 
for human rights. 
Finally, one is left puzzled by the wider 
purpose or use of the argument of 
Howard and Donnelly. It is remarkably 
barren in terms of producing empirical 
expectations about the variation in 
human-rights violations cross-nationally, 
except for the unexciting proposition that 
liberal societies will do better than other 
societies of the world, which, right-wing 
or left-wing, communist or corporatist, 
presumably do more or less equally badly. 
At least with Jeane Kirkpatrick, whose 
work develops some similar themes, we 
are provided with distinctions in terms 
of human rights performance in "non- 
democratic" countries that are empirically 
testable. And while the comparatively 
good performance-though only in terms 
of civil and political rights-of liberal 
regimes is plausibly attributed to values, 
no consideration is given to alternative 
explanations or other conditions, like the 
presence of a market economy or the gen- 
erally superior material well-being that 
one also finds in these societies. Nor 
is any explanation provided for why 
human-rights violations still occur within 
these societies." Is it the result of the in- 
adequate diffusion of liberal values? But 
we are never even told who should hold 
these values: the people, policymakers, or 
both. Nor are we told why these societies, 
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in their foreign policies, can consistently 
support hideous client regimes if there is 
such a "deep and essential theoretical con- 
nection" between human rights and liber- 
alism. Whatever the article's purpose, the 
reason for this comment is the worry that 
in such an important and politically sensi- 
tive area this article, perhaps inadvertent- 
ly, contributes to what our profession 
should be dedicated to fight-ethno- 
centrism. 
NEIL MITCHELL 
University of New Mexico 
Neil Mitchell's major concern appears 
to be our definition of liberalism, particu- 
larly that a liberal regime in our concep- 
tion looks like a European welfare state 
rather than the world of Locke, or the 
robber barons, or the United States in 
1987. This results, he claims, from the fact 
that it is "tied to no particular theorist, 
century, or country." Even more serious- 
ly, he charges that it "is a philosophical 
hybrid that no one will claim" and that his 
suspiciono" is that our procedure was "to 
first read the universal declaration and 
then pick, choose, derive, and discard as 
necessary." 
In "Human Dignity, Human Rights, 
and Political Regimes," we directly and 
explicitly (pp. 802-3) tie our conception 
of liberalism to the work of Ronald 
Dworkin, which stands firmly within a 
well-recognized theoretical tradition run- 
ning back to Locke, through Paine. The 
implicit empirical referent for our ideal 
type is the modern liberal-democratic 
welfare state, particularly in its European 
social-democratic form. We connect the 
socialism of Tawney, Orwell, Crick, and 
the Swedish Social Democrats with liberal 
social democracy. In other words, we 
explicitly argue for both the theoretical 
cogency and historical pedigree of our 
conception of liberalism. 
Of course, liberalism thus ends up look- 
ing more like a world of "to each accord- 
ing to his need" than Engels's account of 
early industrial Manchester. This has 
been precisely the direction of develop- 
ment of the liberal tradition, both in 
theory and in practice, over the last cen- 
tury. Our ideal type was intended to fit 
this real and concretely embodied tradi- 
tion, rather than to maintain an anach- 
ronistic fidelity to Locke, as Mitchell 
would apparently have us do. We see no 
reason why liberals must accept every 
opinion of Locke-for example, non- 
toleration of Catholics-as dogma. Locke 
was certainly an important source of the 
liberal tradition, but he did not engrave 
the complete tenets of liberalism in stone. 
We can see no reason why liberals should 
be required to wear the cement boots of a 
three-hundred-year-old book of 243 num- 
bered paragraphs. Mitchell's reference to 
Mill, moreover, seems a non sequitur; we 
can recall no defense of natural or human 
rights in any of Mill's major political or 
moral works. 
It is true that we provided a country 
referent for communist states, namely 
Soviet-bloc countries, but not for liberal. 
We agree that we ought to have provided 
such a referent, as Mitchell appears, 
especially in his statement that "these 
[liberal] societies in their foreign policies 
can consistently support hideous client 
regimes," to think that our implicit refer- 
ent is the United States. It is not. We are 
perfectly prepared to entertain the 
hypothesis that the United States more 
closely approximates a minimal than a 
liberal state (and not merely because mini- 
malism is currently "electorally popular" 
under Reagan). A society that has the 
material capacity to provide universal 
health care or universal maternal benefits 
but nevertheless chooses not to does not 
strike us as one based on equal concern 
and respect for all its citizens (see Gold- 
stein, N.d.). The U.S. government's lack 
of respect for its citizens can perhaps 
explain why it supports hideous client 
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regimes such as Chile and Guatemala, 
whereas Norway, for example, extends its 
foreign aid to such countries as Mozam- 
bique and Nicaragua (Skalnes and 
Egeland 1986). 
Thus, we proposed an ideal type of 
rights-protecting regime, which resembles 
European social democracy and which we 
called liberalism. But suppose we are 
wrong and this regime should not be 
called liberal. Let's call it x instead. Our 
argument remains the same: international 
human-rights standards require an x 
regime. 
Mitchell professes to be "puzzled by the 
wider purpose or use of this article." This 
is perhaps because he entirely misses its 
major, and quite explicit, analytical pur- 
pose, namely, to distinguish between 
societies based on human rights and 
societies with alternative-non-rights- 
based-conceptions of human dignity. 
We do not argue that the only valuable 
way to preserve human dignity is through 
human rights; we merely argue that it is 
one way, and a particularly useful one in 
a world of state societies (p. 803). Mitchell 
could have challenged our definition of 
human rights as "entitlements that ground 
particularly powerful claims against the 
state, that each person has simply as a 
human being" (p. 802). Had he rejected 
our definition of rights and proposed 
another, he might have been able to show 
that x is not the only rights-protecting 
regime and substantiated his claim that 
there are "alternative traditions and 
regimes" that support human rights. But 
as he does not make any such argument, 
we can find no reason to alter our views. 
Mitchell also claims that we are guilty 
of "inappropriate comparisons," particu- 
larly in our account of communism, 
which we based on contemporary theo- 
retical works from, as well as observed 
practice in, Soviet-bloc countries. For 
neither liberalism nor communism do we 
rely on the original classics, neither Locke 
nor Marx, as Mitchell appears to wish us 
to. An ideal type of communist regime 
derived from Marx, rather than from 
Lenin or via Soviet practice, either is like- 
ly to look very much like our social demo- 
cratic liberalism, or will have few or no 
empirical referents. We should also note 
that while Mitchell may find it unsurpris- 
ing that communism a la the Soviet Union 
falls short of international human-rights 
standards, such a view is very controver- 
sial, as several works cited in our article 
indicate. Furthermore, we want to stress 
that Soviet human-rights hortcomings do 
not arise merely because that country has 
deviated from the "true" path of social- 
ism. Theoretical concepts such as the dic- 
tatorship of the proletariat demand denial 
of human rights. 
Mitchell finds particularly "curious" 
our argument that economic benefits in 
communist regimes are not enjoyed as 
human rights. He appears to believe that 
having the substance of a right, for exam- 
ple, having access to health care, is 
synonymous with having a claim against 
the state to provide it. We agree that hav- 
ing the substance is better than nothing at 
all, but it is a privilege (subject to arbi- 
trary state removal without any kind of 
redress, even in principle or law) rather 
than a right. In communist regimes, all 
rights are contingent grants of the state, 
rather than entitlements one has simply as 
a human being. This difference, enshrined 
in practice and even in the Soviet con- 
stitution, is of monumental theoretical 
and empirical importance. Mitchell claims 
however that Article 29 of the universal 
declaration supports the Soviet constitu- 
tion by stating that the enjoyment of 
human rights is contingent on the dis- 
charge of social duties. It does not; rather 
it holds that "everyone has duties to the 
community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is pos- 
sible," and that the only legitimate reason 
to limit an individual's rights and free- 
doms is to secure "due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of 
925 
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others." While in the Soviet constitution 
rights are contingent on the fulfillment of 
duties, no such contingency is provided in 
the universal declaration. 
There are also three minor points to 
which we would like to respond. First, 
Mitchell takes issue with our description 
of minimalism as internally inconsistent. 
We readily agree that a political regime 
can quite comfortably adhere to an incon- 
sistent set of political principles. But we 
do believe that a fundamental internal 
inconsistency (and one that reflects a clear 
class bias) is enough to remove minimal- 
ism from consideration as a plausible 
regime for those concerned with human 
rights. 
Secondly, he claims that we do not 
clearly specify the origin of liberalism. 
But we did state as briefly as we could the 
generally accepted proposition (with 
which we expect he would agree) that lib- 
eralism arose with the creation of modem 
capitalist society, especially with the rise 
of the bourgeois class (p. 804). We agree 
that we did not explain, in this particular 
short article, why liberal regimes still 
violate so many rights. 
Thirdly, Mitchell claims that our article 
is "remarkably barren in terms of produc- 
ing empirical expectations about the 
variations of human-rights violations 
cross-nationally," and he states that we 
"presumably" believe that all nonliberal 
regimes perform "more or less equally 
badly." This is simply wrong. In the last 
half of our article, we explicitly differen- 
tiate among various nonliberal regimes. 
We do, in fact, provide some empirical 
expectations about human-rights per- 
formances. We think that traditional, 
communist, and perhaps developmental, 
regimes are more likely to provide for the 
substance of social and economic rights 
than minimalist or corporatist ones; and 
we also think that communist and devel- 
opmentalist regimes are more likely to 
value equality than minimalist, tradi- 
tional, or corporatist societies. From a 
moral point of view, we think equality is 
better than hierarchy, and the substance 
of social and economic rights is better 
than nothing at all, even if the regime 
holding these ideals is not rights based. 
Thus were we, for example, to be advising 
a U.S. president on foreign policy in 
Central America, we would advise sup- 
porting Nicaragua over Guatemala or El 
Salvador, in contrast, for example, to 
Jeane Kirkpatrick's (1979) minimalist 
preferences- 
Finally, there is the charge of ethno- 
centrism, which Mitchell puts in a rather 
condescending fashion. As it comes out of 
the blue without any explanation, we can 
only ask, What is ethnocentric about tak- 
ing a standard that is reflected legally in a 
universal document to which practically 
all states now pay at least lip service and 
that applies to everybody in an entirely 
universalistic fashion? Certainly, Mitchell 
does not appear to want to argue that any 
of the regimes we criticize respects human 
rights. Nor do we imagine that he wants 
to argue that simply because someone 
lives in a Third World Nation his or her 
government should be held to lower 
standards. 
To insist on the universal relevance of 
international human-rights standards is 
not ethnocentrism. Rather, it is to insist 
on the liberating power, in a world of 
state societies, of the idea of human 
rights. And it is to refuse to agree that 
anything goes, that whatever a dictator or 
ruling class (of whatever ideological 
stripe) calls respect for human rights is 
such respect. Like so many others, 
Mitchell, out of a misplaced fear of ethno- 
centrism, would leave us unable to charge 
tyrants, despots, and oppressive ruling 
classes with violating human rights. A 
central objective of our article was to help 
lay to rest this all-too-familiar erosion of 
the idea of human rights. 
RHODA E. HOWARD 
McMaster University 
JACK DONNELLY 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
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Notes 
Neil Mitchell thanks James McCormick of Iowa 
State University and Karen Remmer of the Univer- 
sity of New Mexico for their comments. 
1. For Justice Thurgood Marshall, liberal docu- 
mernts and regimes seem to provide scant protection 
from repression. He said in 1978, "During most of 
the past two hundred years, the Constitution as 
interpreted by this court did not prohibit the most 
ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination 
against the Negro" (McCluskey, 1986). 
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